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FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
This case raises the question of whether the 
Government’s involvement at a chromite ore processing plant 
during World War I and World War II made it an “operator” 
under § 107(a)(2) of the Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (“CERCLA”), 42 
U.S.C. § 9607, and thus liable to PPG Industries, Inc. for the 
cleanup costs associated with the waste. The District Court 
concluded that the Government was not subject to operator 
liability because its actions in relation to the plant were 
consistent with general wartime influence over an industry and 
did not extend to control over the plant’s pollution-related 
activities. Accordingly, the District Court denied PPG’s 
motion for summary judgment and granted the Government’s. 
We will affirm.  
I. Background 
Because the key question in this case is whether the 
Government exercised the requisite control over pollution-
related operations at PPG’s property at the time hazardous 
substances were released, we review in detail the facts 
regarding the Government’s historic management and 
direction of the relevant industry (chromium chemicals). 
A. Chromium Chemicals Production and Waste Disposal at 
the Site 
Beginning around 1915, Natural Products Refining 
Corporation (“NPRC”) operated a chemical plant in Jersey 
City, New Jersey, at which it turned chromite ore into 
chromium chemicals (primarily sodium bichromate) used for 
dyeing cloth and tanning leather. The manufacturing process 
generated hazardous chemical waste in various forms, 
including large amounts of “mud” or “sludge.” Most of the 
waste was stockpiled outdoors, “uncovered and exposed to the 
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elements.” J.A. 225. Consequently, hazardous substances 
eventually seeped into the soil and groundwater. 
B. Government Regulation of Chromium Chemicals During 
WWI and WWII 
During both World Wars, the Government regulated the 
production of chromium chemicals like the ones NPRC 
manufactured in Jersey City. Much of the historical record 
surrounding the Government’s involvement with chromium 
processing at the site during WWI has been lost to time. 
Therefore, the bulk of the record concerns the Government’s 
actions during WWII.1 At that time, the chromium chemicals 
industry in the United States consisted of five producers, 
including NPRC, and six plants, including the site at issue here. 
During World War II, the Government designated chromium 
chemicals as “critical” war materials—products manufactured 
for direct military use—and implemented several controls. 
1. Price Controls 
The Government issued various orders designed to 
conserve chromium and direct its distribution. For example, 
the War Production Board controlled the price of raw 
materials, the quantities of chromite ore that processors such 
as NPRC could buy, to whom they could sell, how much they 
could sell, and which of their purchase orders had priority. 
These orders did not, however, direct how the ores were to be 
processed, how the chromium chemicals were to be made, or 
how chromium waste was to be handled. 
 
1 PPG argues “[i]t is highly likely” that during WWI, 
the Government provided similar direction to what it provided 




2. Labor Controls 
Labor shortages in the chromium chemicals industry 
were particularly severe during WWII because of low wages 
and poor working conditions. Alarmed that such shortages 
would affect the war effort, various federal agencies worked to 
address the problem. These efforts ranged from studying ways 
to improve working conditions, to authorizing wage increases 
for workers, to calling in the Army to seize plants where 
workers were on strike. There is, however, no evidence that the 
Government ever seized NPRC’s plant. 
In addition, at various points the Government suggested 
making changes to the workweek schedule at production 
facilities. For example, although NPRC initially operated on a 
six-day workweek to avoid paying overtime rates, in early 
1944, a representative from the Army Service Forces suggested 
that “an effort be made to provide 7-day operation.” JA663. 
From then on, NPRC operated the site seven days a week. 
3. Production Controls and Subsidies 
By early 1944, the United States faced a growing 
shortage of chromium chemicals. Concerned about the impact 
of the shortage on the war effort, the Chemicals Bureau of the 
War Production Board convened a committee that included 
various government entities and industry representatives, 
including NPRC’s president. The committee considered three 
proposals to bolster production: (1) run the same ore fewer 
times through the manufacturing process, which would result 
in a higher output of sodium bichromate since each successive 
run of the same ore yields less material for producing sodium 
bichromate; (2) use higher-grade, but more expensive, Russian 
ore; and (3) expand plant capacity. 
Before the war, NPRC had applied for a patent to 
protect the process proposed in the first option. Running the 
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same ore through the manufacturing process fewer times was 
quicker than the traditional process, but also more wasteful, 
because it left chromium in the waste sludge that would have 
otherwise been extracted in the additional runs. NPRC reported 
that it probably could increase production “by wasteful use of 
chromite ore . . . but the ore losses w[ould] have to be 
subsidized.” J.A. 492. To address this concern, the 
Government Metals Reserve considered buying the waste 
sludge at a price high enough to compensate manufacturers for 
their uneconomic use of ore. On April 6, 1944, the Chemicals 
Bureau officially recommended that producers—including 
NPRC—switch to the quicker, more wasteful process. A few 
days later, however, the Metals Reserve formally rejected the 
sludge purchasing plan as falling outside its “sphere of 
activities.” J.A. 513. NPRC implemented the process anyway, 
but there is no evidence that Metals Reserve, or any other 
federal entity, ever purchased waste sludge from NPRC. 
NPRC rejected the second option, using more expensive 
Russian ore with a higher chromium content. Although the 
Government subsidized the purchase of Russian ore, NPRC 
stated: “We have no high grade ore on hand at the present time, 
nor do we anticipate the purchase of any unless we are 
compelled to do so on account of a shortage of low grade ore.” 
J.A. 522. While there is evidence that other chromium 
chemical manufacturers took this subsidy, there is no evidence 
that NPRC ever did.  
The chromium chemicals manufacturers opposed the 
third option—expanding plant capacity—because they did not 
want new competition. Instead, the companies, including 
NPRC, attempted to expand production at existing plants. 
NPRC applied for a project to expand production, which the 
War Production Board approved and secured funding for. A 
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few months later, however, NPRC decided against the 
expansion. 
C. PPG’s Purchase and Cleanup of the Site 
PPG purchased the site from NPRC in 1954 and 
processed chromium chemicals there until 1963. PPG used 
essentially the same processes as NPRC had, including 
stockpiling the waste outdoors. Since 1990, PPG has spent 
$367 million (by its own estimate) to remediate the site, as well 
as other areas contaminated by the waste produced there.2 
In 2012, PPG sued the Government under § 107(a) of 
CERCLA, seeking recovery and contribution for costs 
associated with past and future cleanup efforts. In 2018, after 
over four years of discovery, PPG and the Government brought 
cross-motions for summary judgment. The District Court 
granted the Government’s motion, reasoning that the 
Government was not liable to PPG as an operator under § 
107(a) of CERCLA. PPG appeals.  
II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 
1331. We have jurisdiction to review the District Court’s final 
order under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review 
over a district court’s grant or denial of a motion for summary 
judgment. Pa. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. Trainer Custom Chem., 
 
2 For example, chromium waste was taken to other 
locations in the county for purposes such as “the backfilling of 
demolition sites, preparation for building foundations, 
construction of tank berms, roadway construction, [and] the 
filling of wetlands.” J.A. 105–06 (quoting Administrative 
Consent Order between PPG and the New Jersey Department 
of Environmental Protection). 
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LLC, 906 F.3d 85, 91 n.7 (3d Cir. 2018). “Summary judgment 
is proper ‘if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute 
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law.’” Thomas v. Cumberland Cty., 749 F.3d 
217, 222 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). We 
apply the same standard as the District Court and must draw all 
justifiable inferences in the non-moving party’s favor. Id. 
III. Analysis 
PPG argues that the District Court erred in two ways: 
first, in applying the wrong legal standard for past operator 
liability under § 107(a)(2) of CERCLA, and, second, in 
concluding that the Government was not a past operator of the 
site. We first clarify the legal standard that should be applied 
and then determine whether the Government is subject to 
operator liability under that standard.  
A. Past Operator Liability Under § 107(a)(2) of 
CERLCA 
In 1980, Congress enacted CERCLA “in response to the 
serious environmental and health risks posed by industrial 
pollution.” United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 55 (1998). 
CERCLA aims “to promote the ‘timely cleanup of hazardous 
waste sites’ and to ensure that the costs of such cleanup efforts 
were borne by those responsible for the contamination.” 
Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 556 U.S. 
599, 602 (2009) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. 
UGI Utils., Inc., 423 F.3d 90, 94 (2d Cir. 2005)). Accordingly, 
§ 113(f) of CERCLA authorizes government agencies or 
private parties who undertake cleanup efforts at contaminated 
sites to “seek contribution from any other person who is liable 
or potentially liable” for the contamination. 42 U.S.C. 
§ 9613(f)(1). Section 107(a) defines four classes of 
“potentially responsible parties” who may be held strictly 
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liable for releases of hazardous substances that occurred at a 
facility: (1) current owners and operators of the facility; (2) 
persons who owned or operated the facility “at the time of 
disposal of any hazardous substance”; (3) persons who 
arranged for the disposal or treatment of the hazardous 
substance; and (4) persons who transported the hazardous 
substance. Id. § 9607(a); see also Burlington, 556 U.S. at 608–
09. 
The sole issue here is whether the Government is a past 
operator under the second category, that is, a “person who at 
the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or 
operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were 
disposed of.”3 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2) (emphasis added). Both 
parties agree that the Government is a “person,” as defined in 
§ 101(21), and that the site is a “facility,” under § 101(9). See 
id. § 9601(9), (21). The parties disagree, however, about the 
meaning of the word “operator” in § 107(a)(2). Given that the 
statute defines that word only by tautology (“any person 
owning or operating such facility,” id. § 9601(20)(A)(ii)), we 
now turn to a discussion of that term. 
This is not the first time that we have considered the 
meaning of the term “operator” in the context of § 107(a)(2) of 
CERCLA. We must look to prior decisions of our Court, as 
well as the Supreme Court, to guide our analysis of this issue.  
First, in FMC Corp. v. United States Department of 
Commerce, 29 F.3d 833 (3d Cir. 1994) (en banc), we 
considered a CERCLA claim by the owner of a rayon 
manufacturing plant for contribution from the United States for 
 
3 PPG does not allege that the United States owned the 




the cleanup of an industrial facility. The manufacturer claimed 
that the United States was liable as a past operator because it 
“became involved so pervasively in the facility [during WWII] 
that it effectively operated the plant along with [the owner at 
the time].” Id. at 835. We applied the “actual control” test, 
under which an entity is “liable for the environmental 
violations of another [entity] if there is evidence that it 
exercised ‘substantial control’ over the other [entity]. At a 
minimum, substantial control requires ‘active involvement in 
the activities’ of the other [entity].” Id. at 843 (quoting 
Lansford-Coaldale Joint Water Auth. v. Tonolli Corp., 4 F.3d 
1209, 1222 (3d Cir. 1993)).4 
We held that the government had “substantial control” 
over the facility, had “active involvement in the activities 
there,” and “exerted considerable day-to-day control over [the 
owner of the facility].” Id. at 843–44 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). Specifically, 
The government determined what 
product the facility would 
manufacture, controlled the supply 
and price of the facility’s raw 
materials, in part by building or 
causing plants to be built near the 
facility for their production, 
supplied equipment for use in the 
 
4 We first adopted the “actual control” test in Lansford-
Coaldale, 4 F.3d at 1209. Although we acknowledged that 
Lansford-Coaldale “arose in the context of related 
corporations,” we determined that its “active control” test was 
“nevertheless instructive” in determining whether the 
government was a past operator. FMC, 29 F.3d at 843.  
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manufacturing process, acted to 
ensure that the facility retained an 
adequate labor force, participated 
in the management and 
supervision of the labor force, had 
the authority to remove workers 
who were incompetent or guilty of 
misconduct, controlled the price of 
the facility’s product, and 
controlled who could purchase the 
product. 
Id. at 843. Furthermore, the government knew that “generation 
of hazardous waste inhered in the production process because 
its personnel present at the facility witnessed a large amount of 
highly visible waste disposal activity,” and “wastes were 
generated and disposed of by the government-owned 
equipment that was installed at the facility.” Id. at 837–38. 
Thus, we concluded, “[g]iven this degree of control, and given 
the fact that the wastes would not have been created if not for 
the government’s activities, the government [was] liable as an 
operator.” Id. at 844.   
Four years later, the Supreme Court addressed the 
definitional question. In Bestfoods, the United States argued 
that a parent corporation was a past operator for purposes of 
CERCLA and therefore liable for the costs of cleaning up 
industrial waste generated by its subsidiary’s chemical plant. 
524 U.S. at 55. Bestfoods held that to determine whether to 
impose direct CERCLA operator liability on a parent 
corporation based on pollution from its subsidiary’s facility, 
the question is not whether the parent operates the subsidiary, 
but whether the parent operates the facility. Id. at 66–68. That 
much was clear: “Under the plain language of the statute, any 
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person who operates a polluting facility is directly liable for the 
costs of cleaning up the pollution.” Id. at 65 (emphasis added). 
The more difficult question was determining “the 
actions sufficient to constitute direct parental ‘operation.’” Id. 
at 66. After noting the “uselessness” of CERCLA’s definition 
of an operator, the Court sought to define the term by giving it 
“its ‘ordinary or natural meaning.’” Id. at 66 (quoting Bailey v. 
United States, 516 U.S. 137, 145 (1995)). It stated that “in the 
organizational sense . . . intended by CERCLA, the word 
ordinarily means ‘[t]o conduct the affairs of; manage: operate 
a business’”—or, more specifically to CERCLA, a site or 
facility. Id. (quoting American Heritage Dictionary 1268 (3d 
ed. 1992)). Therefore, the Court continued, “[t]o sharpen the 
definition for purposes of CERCLA’s concern with 
environmental contamination, an operator must manage, 
direct, or conduct operations specifically related to pollution, 
that is, operations having to do with the leakage or disposal of 
hazardous waste, or decisions about compliance with 
environmental regulations.” Id. at 66–67.  
Thus, Bestfoods emphasized that the determination of 
whether an entity is an operator for purposes of CERCLA 
liability must be based on the relationship between the 
potentially responsible party and the waste-producing facility 
at issue. In doing so, Bestfoods rejected the lower court’s 
application of the “actual control” test, which focused on the 
relationship between the potentially responsible party and the 
owner of the facility, rather than on the relationship between 
the potentially responsible party and the facility. Id. at 67–68. 
The Court reasoned that the actual control test improperly 
combined “direct and indirect liability . . . by asking a question 
about the relationship between the two corporations (an issue 
going to indirect liability) instead of a question about the 
parent’s interaction with the subsidiary’s facility (the source of 
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any direct liability).” Id. at 67 (emphasis added). The Court 
ultimately remanded for the district court to assess, in the first 
instance, the parent corporation’s involvement in the activities 
of the subsidiary’s facility.5 Id. at 72–73. 
We subsequently applied the Bestfoods standard in a 
case involving current operator liability under § 107(a)(1) of 
CERCLA. Litgo N.J., Inc. v. Comm’r N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 
725 F.3d 369 (3d Cir. 2013). There, a purchaser of a 
contaminated site argued that it should not be held liable as a 
current operator because it did not engage in any operations 
that caused further contamination, and therefore was not 
involved in “operations specifically related to pollution.” Id. at 
381 (quoting Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 66). We, however, rejected 
that reading of Bestfoods as too narrow, explaining that: 
In defining “operator,” the 
Supreme Court employed broad, 
passive language: an operator is 
one who is involved in operations 
“having to do with the leakage or 
disposal of hazardous waste,” not 
one who is involved in operations 
“causing” or “leading to” the 
 
5 Under the specific facts of Bestfoods, there was 
evidence that an agent of the parent corporation “played a 
conspicuous part in dealing with the toxic risks emanating from 
the operation of the plant.” 524 U.S. at 72. Because of the work 
of this agent, the parent corporation “became directly involved 
in environmental and regulatory matters.” Id. Thus, the 
Supreme Court found that the parent corporation’s “operation” 




leakage or disposal of waste. 
Moreover, the Court expressly 
noted that operator liability may be 
imposed when a party is 
responsible for “decisions about 
compliance with environmental 
regulations,” a description which 
directly applies to the 
[purchaser’s] activities at the 
Property. 
Id. at 382 (internal citations omitted). We concluded that the 
purchaser was actively involved in activities related to the 
contamination on the property: not only did it have the actual 
authority “to make decisions about compliance with 
environmental regulations, [it] hired environmental 
consultants to conduct tests and remediation operations . . . and 
. . . oversaw that work.” Id. at 381.  
In sum, consistent with FMC, the Bestfoods standard (1) 
focuses on the relationship between the purported operator and 
the facility at issue; and (2) further focuses on “operations 
specifically related to pollution.” 524 U.S. at 66. Subsequently, 
in Litgo, we maintained an appropriate focus on pollution-
related activities at the facility. Also in Litgo, we applied the 
Bestfoods operator definition outside the parent-subsidiary 
context. 
Here, PPG argues that because Bestfoods did not 
address whether and under what circumstances the government 
can be held liable as an operator, we should follow the standard 
outlined in FMC, where we held that the government was liable 
as an operator because it “had ‘substantial control’ over the 
facility and ‘active involvement in the activities’ there.” 
Appellant’s Br. 44–45 (quoting FMC, 29 F.3d at 843). Indeed, 
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PPG alleges that “as in FMC, the Government [here] was an 
operator of the [site] during WWII.” Appellant’s Br. 48. We 
disagree. 
While PPG is correct that Bestfoods did not address 
when the government can be held liable as an operator, this 
distinction is irrelevant. At no point, regardless of how the test 
was formulated, has any court said that the test for determining 
operator liability should be different depending on whether the 
potentially responsible party is the government, a parent or 
subsidiary, or some other type of corporation. See FMC, 29 
F.3d at 843 (taking a test we originally applied to corporate 
parties and applying it to the government)6; Litgo, 725 F.3d at 
382 (applying the Bestfoods operator definition to a 
potentially-liable party outside of the parent-subsidiary 
context). Thus, the Bestfoods operator definition is not limited 
to the parent-subsidiary context and applies when the question 
is whether the government can be held liable as an operator.7 
 
6 We explained that while the Lansford-Coaldale 
“actual control” test “arose in the context of related 
corporations, it is nevertheless instructive here.” FMC, 29 F.3d 
at 843. 
7 Bestfoods discusses the parent-subsidiary relationship 
at length in order to emphasize that traditional parent 
responsibility or indirect liability for subsidiary acts is 
immaterial in the CERCLA context. The Court makes clear 
that “the plain language” of CERCLA imposes direct liability 
on an operator—“regardless of whether that person is the 
facility’s owner, the owner’s parent corporation or business 
partner, or even a saboteur who sneaks into the facility at night 
to discharge its poisons out of malice . . . [T]he existence of the 
parent-subsidiary relationship under state corporate law is 
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Alternatively, PPG argues that to the extent that we 
conclude that Bestfoods is applicable, the Bestfoods definition 
of operator does not mean that “operators” “are limited to 
employees directly working with, or making low-level 
decisions about, hazardous waste.” Appellant’s Br. 42. Rather, 
PPG emphasizes, “[t]he statute obviously meant something 
more than mere mechanical activation of pumps and valves, 
and must be read to contemplate ‘operation’ as including the 
direction over the facility’s activities.” Appellant’s Br. 42 
(quoting Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 71). Thus, PPG argues that the 
term “operator” “encompasses persons having general control 
over a facility.” Appellant’s Br. 42. 
We disagree. Bestfoods clarified that operator liability 
only extends to those who “manage, direct, or conduct 
operations specifically related to pollution, that is, operations 
having to do with the leakage or disposal of hazardous waste 
or decisions about compliance with environmental 
regulations.” 524 U.S. at 66–67 (emphasis added). This means 
that operator liability requires something more than general 
control over an industry or facility—it requires some indicia of 
control over the facility’s polluting activities. Thus, the 
language the Supreme Court used in Bestfoods suggests that 
operator liability requires something more than general 
wartime control over an industry.  
Rather, Bestfoods instructs that an operator must 
exercise control over “operations having to do with the leakage 
or disposal of hazardous waste or decisions about compliance 
 
simply irrelevant to the issue of direct liability.” 524 U.S. at 
65. The same holds true, perhaps even more strongly, in a case 




with environmental regulations.” 524 U.S. at 66–67.  Under 
Bestfoods, then, to prevail on its claim that the Government 
operated the site, PPG must show that the Government 
exercised control over such operations. 
We will now apply the Bestfoods standard for operator 
liability. 
B. The Government Is Not Subject to Operator Liability 
Under CERCLA 
Applying the Bestfoods definition of operator, we 
conclude that the District Court did not err in concluding that 
the Government never directly managed, directed, or 
conducted NPRC’s operations specifically related to pollution.  
1. The Government Did Not Control Operations Related to 
Pollution   
We agree with PPG that the Government was involved 
in various aspects of production at NPRC’s plant during 
WWII. For example, the Government controlled the price of 
raw materials, the quantities of chromite ore that processors 
such as NPRC could buy, to whom they could sell, how much 
they could sell, and which of their purchase orders had priority. 
Furthermore, the Government worked to ameliorate severe 
labor shortages in the chromium chemicals industry by 
studying ways to improve working conditions, authorizing 
wage increases for workers, and calling in the Army in 
response to a labor strike—though there is no evidence that the 
Government ever seized NPRC’s plant. 
However, PPG has presented no evidence that the 
Government specifically controlled operations related to 
pollution. PPG has not offered any evidence to suggest that the 
Government was involved with or responsible for the practice 
of stockpiling the waste outdoors, which is what led to the 
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contamination. In fact, the evidence shows that this was 
NPRC’s practice both before and after the World Wars.8  
PPG contends that, under the Bestfoods standard, there 
was a “nexus” between the Government’s activities and 
“waste-disposal matters” at the site because “[t]he overall 
process . . . [,] with which the Government was familiar[,] was 
inherently hazardous-waste-producing.” Appellant Br. 52. The 
Government understood, PPG argues, that “[c]hrome-laden 
mud was an inevitable byproduct. Groundwater contamination, 
in turn, was an inevitable consequence of stockpiling the mud 
outside at the Site. Thus, the Government’s pressuring [NPRC] 
to ramp up production was . . . a Government directive to 
produce more . . . waste.” Appellant’s Br. 52.  
This argument fails. To the extent that PPG alleges that 
the Government is liable because it was merely aware of 
NPRC’s practice of stockpiling the waste outdoors, PPG 
misstates the law: knowledge of a practice is not the same as 
undertaking that practice for the purposes of operator liability 
under CERCLA. For liability to attach, “an operator must 
manage, direct, or conduct operations specifically related to 
pollution.” Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 66. “[M]ere knowledge of 
waste disposal activities, hazardous or otherwise, although a 
prerequisite to ‘operator’ liability, does not, without more, 
suffice to establish CERCLA ‘operator’ liability.” Lentz v. 
Mason, 961 F. Supp. 709, 716 (D.N.J. 1997).  
PPG further argues that there was a “nexus” between 
the Government’s actions and waste disposal at the site 
 
8 “During the period the chromate production facility 
operated,” between about 1909 and 1963, “the majority [of 
chromium waste] was stockpiled on the southeastern corner of 
Site 114 and on the adjacent Site 137.” J.A. 230–31.  
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because the Government “directed” NPRC to switch to the 
quicker, more wasteful manufacturing process. Appellant’s Br. 
52. It reasons that, given the critical importance of chromium 
for the war effort and the fact that the Government could have 
seized the plant, the Government did more than just 
recommend that NPRC make the switch. But there is no 
evidence that the Government seized or threatened to seize the 
NPRC plant. And the mere existence of seizure authority does 
not support operator liability. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. United 
States, 108 F. Supp. 3d 486, 524 (S.D. Tex. 2015). In addition, 
PPG has offered no evidence permitting an inference that the 
Government “demanded,” as opposed to “recommended,” that 
NPRC switch to the quicker, more wasteful manufacturing 
process. J.A. 585–86 (“The Chemicals Bureau Requirements 
Committee . . . recommends that . . . [a]rrangements be made 
to increase production of sodium bichromate . . . by . . . 
purchasing waste sludge from production operations to 
eliminate reworking of ore . . . .”). 
Finally, PPG argues that there was a “nexus” between 
the Government’s activities and waste disposal at the site 
because the Government provided NPRC with a sludge 
subsidy. This argument rests on a shaky factual foundation. As 
recounted above, NPRC told the Government that it could 
increase production “by wasteful use of chromite ore . . . but 
the ore losses w[ould] have to be subsidized,” J.A. 492; the 
Metals Reserve considered subsidizing waste sludge to address 
this concern; and the Chemicals Bureau officially 
recommended that NPRC switch to the quicker, more wasteful 
process. A few days later, however, the Metals Reserve 
formally rejected the sludge purchase plan as falling outside its 
“sphere of activities,” J.A. 123–24, and there is no evidence 




PPG argues that there must have been a subsidy—
otherwise, when NPRC switched to the quicker process in 
1944, it would have incurred losses, rather than what actually 
happened, which is that it did better financially. PPG also 
points to a 1949 Government memorandum directing the 
destruction of Defense Supplies Corporation records related to 
numerous topics, including “Sodium Bichromate Subsidy.” 
These circumstantial arguments are insufficient to create a 
genuine factual dispute in the face of evidence showing that the 
sludge purchase plan was rejected. 
In addition, while there is evidence that other chromium 
chemical manufacturers participated in the Russian ore 
subsidy, PPG presents no evidence that NPRC ever did. 
Rather, NPRC stated that “[w]e have no high grade ore on hand 
at the present time, nor do we anticipate the purchase of any 
unless we are compelled to do so on account of a shortage of 
lower grade ore.” J.A. 189. 
Ultimately, PPG’s argument boils down to the 
following: when faced with a Government directive to increase 
output during a time of war, NPRC rose to the occasion, and 
more production meant more waste, which makes the 
Government liable as an operator. However, a closer 
examination of the facts shows that NPRC did not have to 
switch to the quicker, more wasteful process; it could have 
chosen the Russian ore option to increase output, as other 
chromium chemicals manufacturers did. Furthermore, the 
dispositive question is: did the Government “manage, direct, 
or conduct operations specifically related to pollution, that is, 
operations having to do with the leakage or disposal of 
hazardous waste or decisions about compliance with 
environmental regulations”? Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 66–67. The 
record clearly answers this question: the Government urged 
NPRC and all chromium chemicals manufacturers to increase 
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output, but it was NPRC that managed operations specifically 
related to pollution. It was entirely NPRC’s decision, not the 
Government’s, to continue the longstanding practice of 
stockpiling the majority of the waste outside and uncovered, 
letting it seep into the soil and groundwater.9 
Therefore, the District Court did not err when it found 
that the Government never specifically managed or conducted 
NPRC’s operations related to pollution. The District Court 
correctly found that the Government’s actions in relation to 
NPRC’s plant were consistent with general wartime influence 
over an industry—not control over NPRC’s pollution-related 
activities. In sum, the Government was not an “operator” under 
§ 107(a)(2) of CERCLA.  
2. FMC is Distinguishable 
PPG emphasizes the factual similarities between this 
case and FMC. However, the cases are not as similar as PPG 
suggests. The government in FMC was involved not only in 
operations at the facility in a general sense, it was specifically 
involved with waste production and regulation. Although FMC 
pre-dates Bestfoods, even under the Bestfoods standard, FMC 
was correctly decided.  
We agree with the District Court that there are at least 
four significant factual differences between FMC and the 
present case that demonstrate that while the government 
operated the facility in FMC, the Government did not do so 
here. In FMC, the government (1) built and retained ownership 
of new facilities near the plant; (2) had a representative on site; 
(3) ordered the facility to produce a different product; and (4) 
supplied employees to install equipment. Indeed, in FMC, the 
government effectively seized total control of the plant’s 
 
9 It was PPG’s decision, as well, from 1954 to 1963. 
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operations by requiring the manufacturer to convert its plant to 
produce a different product and stepping in to help it achieve 
this goal, which included involvement in waste disposal. For 
example, not only did the government know that “generation 
of hazardous waste inhered in the production process because 
its personnel present at the facility witnessed a large amount of 
highly visible waste disposal activity,” but “wastes were 
generated and disposed of by the government-owned 
equipment that was installed at the facility.” FMC, 29 F.3d at 
837–38. 
This is distinguishable from the situation at the NPRC 
plant, where NPRC freely produced chromium before and after 
the World Wars, where there was no government 
representative on site, and where the Government was much 
less involved in labor decisions and not involved at all in waste 
disposal decisions. Lastly, rather than being directed by the 
Government to employ a specific method for increasing output, 
NPRC itself chose the option that was the most convenient for 
it.10  
In FMC, we concluded that the government “exerted 
considerable day-to-day control” over the company that owned 
the plant at the time. Id. at 845. We closed by holding: “Given 
this degree of control, and given the fact that the wastes would 
not have been created if not for the government’s activities, the 
government is liable as an operator.” Id. at 844. Here, it cannot 
 
10 The quicker, more wasteful process was more 
“convenient” and less costly for NPRC because NPRC already 
owned a patent for the “reworking of ore” process and a 
conversion to this process could be implemented immediately 
without the need for additional equipment or the purchase of 
more expensive ore. 
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be said that the Government exercised the same kind of “day-
to-day” control. NPRC claims that it switched to the quicker, 
more wasteful process at the Government’s insistence, but it 
was the only chromium chemical manufacturer to choose this 
method; the other manufacturers chose to participate in the 
Russian ore subsidy when asked to increase output. And 
perhaps most importantly, the waste would have been created 
and disposed of in the same manner regardless of the 
government’s activities, just as it was before and after the 
World Wars.11  
In sum, the present case is distinguishable from FMC.  
IV. Conclusion 
For these reasons, we will affirm the denial of PPG’s 
motion for summary judgment and grant of the Government’s 
motion for summary judgment. 
 
11 PPG may be correct that less waste would have been 
created if not for the Government’s need to increase output for 
the war effort. What is dispositive, though, is who made the 
decisions about how to increase output and what was done with 
any waste that was created.  
